Abstract "Bell's theorem" can refer to two different theorems that John Bell proved, the first in 1964 and the second in 1976. His 1964 theorem is the incompatibility of quantum phenomena with the joint assumptions of LOCALITY and PREDETERMI-NATION. His 1976 theorem is their incompatibility with the single property of LO-CAL CAUSALITY. This is contrary to Bell's own later assertions, that his 1964 theorem began with the assumption of LOCAL CAUSALITY, even if not by that name. Although the two Bell's theorems are logically equivalent, their assumptions are not. Hence, the earlier and later theorems suggest quite different conclusions, embraced by operationalists and realists, respectively. The key issue is whether LOCALITY or LOCAL CAUSALITY is the appropriate notion emanating from RELATIVISTIC CAUSALITY, and this rests on one's basic notion of causation. For operationalists the appropriate notion is what is here called the Principle of AGENT-CAUSATION, while for realists it is REICHENBACH's Principle of common cause. By breaking down the latter into even more basic Postulates, it is possible to obtain a version of Bell's theorem in which each camp could reject one assumption, happy that the remaining assumptions reflect its weltanschauung. Formulating Bell's theorem in terms of causation is fruitful not just for attempting to reconcile the two camps, but also for better describing the ontology of different quantum interpretations and for more deeply understanding the implications of Bell's marvellous work.
Motivation
The work presented here grew from my 1 observation, over the years, but particularly at a quantum foundations conference in 2013 (see Ref. [1] ), that different 'camps' of physicists and philosophers have a different understanding of what Bell's theorem actually is, and a different understanding of the words (in particular 'locality') often used in stating it. As a consequence they often talk (or shout) past one another, and come no closer to understanding each other's perspective. I have friends in both camps, and I would like to think that they are all reasonable people who should be able to come to terms that allow the pros and cons of different interpretations of Bell's theorem to be discussed calmly.
More recently, my thinking has evolved beyond this original motivation, as a consequence of the 50th anniversary of Bell's annus mirabilis 2 , which led to three invitations to present on the topic: for a special issue of J. Phys. A [4] , for an opinion piece in Nature [5] , and for the Quantum [Un]speakables conference (and thus to a fourth invitation, for these Proceedings). These challenged me to think more deeply about what lay behind the different positions of the two camps, and how this could lead to a deeper understanding of Bell's theorem. The key to my reconsideration is to be found, conveniently, on the the magnificent ceiling of the Festsaal of the Austrian Akademie der Wißenschaften, host to Alain Aspect's public lecture at the Quantum [Un]speakables conference. There, one finds the role of natural philosophy defined as causarum investigatio (Fig: 1) . The investigation of causes, or, more particularly, of notions of causation, has proven to be a very fruitful way to analyse Bell's theorem, and the disagreements over it [6, 7, 8, 4, 5] .
While this chapter, Ref. [5] , and Ref. [4] , each has independent material, they all share some core material, which can be summarized as follows. Bell actually proved two theorems (Sec. 3). The 1964 one [3] is that This involves two assumptions: "separability or locality" and the "predetermination [of] the result of an individual measurement" [3] . The 1976 one [9] is that quantum mechanics is not embeddable in a locally causal theory and involves a single assumption, "local causality" [9] . Although each theorem is a corollary of the other (Sec. 3.3), they are embraced by different intellectual camps, 1 This first section is written in first person by one of us (Wiseman) , who spoke at the Quantum [Un]speakables conference. The other of us (Cavalcanti) has been a long-time co-worker and correspondent with Wiseman on Bell's theorem. In particular, since the conference, their discussions have convinced Wiseman of a better way to formulate the causal assumptions in Bell's theorem, and this is reflected in the latter parts of the paper, and in its authorship. 2 It was the year he wrote his review of hidden variables (HVs) [2] , by misfortune not published until 1966, in which he dismissed von Neumann's anti-HV proof, gave the first proof of the necessity of contextuality for deterministic HV theories, and raised the question of the necessity of nonlocality, which he immediately answered in the positive in his 1964 paper [3] . Fig. 1 Scene from the ceiling of the Festsaal of the Austrian Akademie der Wißenschaften whom I will call operationalists and realists respectively (Sec. 4). The latter, however, deny that there are really two different theorems, claiming that in his 1964 paper Bell used 'locality' to mean LOCAL CAUSALITY, and that from it he derived PREDETERMINATION 3 rather than assuming it. I have argued in depth [4, 11] that this is a misrepresentation of what Bell proved in 1964.
Whether LOCALITY or LOCAL CAUSALITY is the appropriate notion emanating from Einstein's Principle of relativity rests on one's underlying concept of causation. Operationalists and realists implicitly hold to quite different notions of causation and it is fruitful to make this explicit (Sec. 5). These last points lead on to the notable new material in this chapter: a form of Bell's theorem that could be acceptable to both camps (Sec. 6), and discussion of the many other advantages of formulating Bell's theorem in terms of causation (Sec. 7). 
The situation Bell considered
The experimental situation Bell considered is shown as a Minkowski (space-time) diagram in Fig. 2 . This is closely based on such diagrams which Bell used in Refs. [9, 12] , for example. He did not use such a diagram in 1964, and only briefly referred to relativistic concepts, but the diagrams he used in his definitive paper on the subject [12] are applicable to, and even use the same notation as, his original 1964 paper. It is convenient to use something close to the form of diagram which Bell finally settled upon [12] , as it allows the assumptions from both those theorems (LOCALITY and PREDETERMINATION in 1964; LOCAL CAUSALITY in 1976) to be stated naturally. Considering more general distributions of events in space-time lead to different conclusions about which assumptions can be stated naturally; see Sec. 7 and Ref. [10] .
The experiment involves two observers, Alice and Bob, with spatially separated laboratories, where they perform experiments that are independent, but may have correlated outcomes. This allows them to perform experiments in space-likeseparated regions of space-time, labelled A and B respectively. In her region, Alice makes a free choice a of setting for her measurement, which yields an outcome A, and Bob likewise, mutatis mutandis. In the overlap of the past light-cones of A and B is a preparation event c which is necessary to produce the correlations between the outcomes. Even for a fixed preparation c, the ability of Alice and Bob to make free choices, and the existence of multiple possible outcomes, gives rise to a PHENOMENON described by the relative frequencies 4 { f (A, B|a, b, c) : A, B, a, b}.
(
The existence of correlations in the outcomes in a physics experiment is typically 'explained' by stepping away from operationalist language, in a manner such as this:
the event c prepares a correlated pair of particles, one of which goes to A and the other to B, each at subluminal speed.
Stepping even further away from operationalism, we follow Bell in allowing for the possibility of non-observable (or "hidden") variables in the formalism, introducing variables λ , defined at a time -i.e. on a space-like hypersurface (SLH) -before a and b but after c, that could describe these particles, or anything else of relevance 5 . Note in particular that λ could represent a pure quantum state |λ , since this is a mathematical object defined on a SLH. If the source c reliably produces this particular pure state then this |λ would contain no more information than is already given by specifying c. But this is an idealization, and in general |λ would have some distribution given c, and so is just like any other hidden variable. In general, we say that a MODEL (which Bell [3] called a 'theory') θ for the above PHENOMENON, comprises a probability distribution for hidden variables, P θ (λ |c), and further probabilities P θ (A, B|a, b, c, λ ), such that 6
Note that by considering a MODEL with non-trivial dependence on λ , one is not presuming PREDETERMINATION of outcomes:
(See the next section for the source of this terminology.) An example of a hidden variable MODEL that is stochastic (i.e. that violates PREDETERMINATION) is the one mentioned above, where c prepares a mixed quantum state ρ c and λ is taken to define a pure quantum state |λ such that ρ c = ∑ λ P θ (λ |c) |λ λ |.
Note also that PREDETERMINATION should not be confused with the stronger and purely operational notion of PREDICTABILITY [13] :
While we have defined PREDICTABILITY in terms of the experimental frequencies f (A, B|a, b, c), for a given MODEL it is of course possible to determine whether the PHENOMENON it is supposed to describe has this property, via Eq. (2). The point is that a MODEL may satisfy PREDETERMINATION even though the PHENOMENON does not satisfy PREDICTABILITY.
The Two Bell's Theorem of John Bell
In this section we present the two theorems, in chronological order, and then discuss the relationship between them. In a theory in which parameters are added to quantum mechanics to determine the results of individual measurements, without changing the statistical predictions, there must be a mechanism whereby the setting of one measuring device can influence the reading of another instrument, however remote.
Bell's 1964 theorem
Here the italics, added by us, emphasize the two assumptions that lead to a contradiction with the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics; the second assumption is stated in the negative, since its negation follows if one holds to the first assumption. These two assumptions are stated positively, with equal status, in the immediate preceding sentence, at the end of his Section V:
for at least one . . . state . . . the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics are incompatible with separable predetermination as quoted in Sec. 1 above. As was noted there, Bell did not distinguish separability from locality, and he is explicit that PREDETERMINATION means "predetermination [of] the result of an individual measurement". Thus his theorem is:
Theorem 1 (Bell-1964) . There exist quantum PHENOMENA for which there is no MODEL satisfying PREDETERMINATION and LOCALITY.
Although this was not the case in 1964, the quantum phenomena relevant to Bell's theorem have long since been verified experimentally, albeit with a few challenging loopholes [5, 14] .
It is presumably uncontroversial to understand PREDETERMINATION as per Definition 1 already given above. The meaning of LOCALITY is more controversial, to say the least (compare Refs. [15, 16] with Refs. [4, 11] ). However, by our reading, Bell is quite clear: the requirement of locality [is] more precisely that the result of a measurement on one system be unaffected by operations on a distant system This is of course the positive form of the final notion in the first quote in this section, and Bell states the same assumption (the irrelevance of Alice's measurement choice to Bob's outcome) twice more in the paper. Although he successfully applies the notion of locality only to theories with predetermined outcomes, he introduces it prior to making the assumption of predetermination 7 . Thus it seems that we should adopt a definition that accords with his words and applies to probabilistic theories: 7 He introduces it in the first paragraph of the paper proper, which serves as motivation for the formulation of the assumptions he will use. There, Bell unfortunately misapplies his notion, in attempting to derive predetermination via EPR-Bohm-correlations and locality. See Refs. [4, 11] for discussions of the irrelevance of this flawed paragraph to Bell's 1964 theorem (i.e. the "result to be proved", as he calls it, which he does indeed prove).
Definition 3 (LOCALITY).
∀ a, B, b, λ , P θ (B|a, b, c, λ ) = P θ (B|b, c, λ ), and likewise for Alice's result, which will remain unstated in similar definitions below. (The existence of the function P θ (B|b, c, λ ) is also implicit here, and in similar definitions below.) This definition of LOCALITY was also the one adopted by Jarrett in 1984 [17] . In the same year Shimony [18] coined the phrase "parameter independence" for the same concept, to emphasize that it required only that Bob's outcome be statistically independent of Alice's setting, a controllable 'parameter'. We prefer to follow the terminology of Jarrett and (in our reading) Bell.
Note that LOCALITY is not the same [13] as the purely operational notion of Definition 4 (SIGNAL-LOCALITY).
the violation of which has never been observed, and, most physicists think, never will be observed. However, for a strictly operational MODEL (that is, one that makes no use of hidden variables, be they pure quantum states or other objects) there is no distinction between LOCALITY and SIGNAL-LOCALITY. Thus, operational quantum mechanics, involving only preparations, settings, and outcomes, satisfies LO-CALITY. In fact, LOCALITY is satisfied even in the non-operational quantum theory discussed above, where c prepares ρ c but one assumes that, conditional on the hidden variable λ , the probabilities of outcomes are determined by |λ . In both cases, the reduced quantum state on Bob's side, which is mixed in general, defines probabilities for Bob's outcomes, for any measurement he makes, which are independent of Alice's choice of measurement. Moreover, introducing a realist narrative, involving instantaneous wave-function collapse, makes no difference to the fact that LOCALITY is satisfied, as a mathematical statement about the probability distributions in the theory. Even spontaneous collapse theories such as the celebrated GRW model [19] respect LOCALITY (to the extent that they respect SIGNAL-LOCALITY).
Bell's 1976 theorem
More than a decade after his 1964 paper, Bell reformulated his theorem in a way that he would cleave to, in essence, for the rest of his life. Building on his own work from 1971 [20] and that of Clauser and Horne from 1974 [21] , he introduced a new notion:
Strictly speaking (and Bell was strict about this [9] ), the above is a consequence of the broader Principle of LOCAL CAUSALITY (Principle 2 in Sec. 5.1 below) when applied to the specific set up of Fig. 2 . Note the crucial difference from LOCALITY in that LOCAL CAUSALITY requires Bob's outcome to be statistically independent of Alice's outcome as well as her setting. This, Bell argued, is a reasonable 'localistic' notion for a theory in which λ provides a complete description of the relevant state of affairs prior to the measurements being performed.
As quoted in Sec. 1, Bell proved in 1976 that quantum mechanics is not embeddable in a locally causal theory as formulated [above] .
In other words, he proved a theorem involving only a single assumption: -1976) . There exist quantum PHENOMENA for which there is no MODEL satisfying LOCAL CAUSALITY.
Unfortunately for our purposes, having invented a new concept with a new name, Bell immediately became indiscriminate once more, using "local causality" and 'locality' interchangeably 8 . However, in his most mature treatment of the subject [12] , Bell unequivocally showed his preference for the term "local causality" [4] , and in following suit we respect Bell's final will.
A Fine Distinction
Bell Although we have given the credit here to Fine [23] , this result was known, in essence, by Bell even in 1971 [20] ; see Ref. [4] for details. For this reason, it is useful shorthand to introduce the well-known term Bell-local for describing the type of MODEL that satisfies the broader assumptions of Bell's 1976 theorem. That is,
Definition 6 (BELL-LOCAL). A MODEL θ is BELL-LOCAL if and only if
If the two Bell's theorems are logically equivalent, why should we bother to distinguish them? The answer is that the two different forms appeal to two different camps of scholars, and indeed these two camps often recognise only the one form that they favour. The broad term 'scholars' here is deliberately chosen to cover the increasing range of disciplines -including (at least) physics, philosophy, and information science -interested in Bell's theorem. But it is important to note that the division into two different camps does not sharply follow these disciplinary divisions. Of course there are many more than two attitudes towards Bell's theorem. Nevertheless, the most common attitudes can be broadly grouped within the two camps, called here operationalist and realist.
The Two Camps
The realist camp [24, 25, 15, 26] has the following credo:
Bell's theorem uses only one assumption: local causality (or 'locality' as we usually call it for short). This is the only reasonable way to apply the principle of relativity for statistical theories. It is essentially what EPR assumed in 1935. They showed that operational quantum mechanics is nonlocal, and Bell showed in 1964 that adding hidden variables cannot solve the problem. Experiments violating a Bell inequality thus leave us with no option: the principle of relativity is false. The world is nonlocal.
The operationalist camp [6, 27, 28, 29] , on the other hand, could be caricatured by the following:
Bell's theorem uses two assumptions. The first assumption is locality. This is essentially the same as signal locality, which is all the principle of relativity implies, but also applies to hidden variable theories. Orthodox quantum mechanics respects locality. The second assumption is something else which has been variously called realism, predetermination, determinism, objectivity, classicality, counter-factual-definiteness, and causality (perhaps with slightly different formulations). Clearly it is the second assumption that we should abandon, whatever we call it. Locality is here to stay.
Why do the two camps come to such contrary conclusions? Partly it is just a difference in terminology: realists use 'locality' to mean LOCAL CAUSALITY, while operationalists use it to mean LOCALITY. But the deeper question is why they disagree about which is the 'correct' way to apply the principle of relativity. Bell well explains the motivations of the realist camp [12] :
The obvious definition of "local causality" does not work in quantum mechanics, and this cannot be attributed to the "incompleteness" of that theory. . . . Do we then have to fall back on "no signalling faster than light" as the expression of the fundamental causal structure of contemporary theoretical physics? That is hard for me to accept. For one thing we have lost the idea that correlations can be explained . . . . More importantly, the "no signalling" notion rests on concepts which are desperately vague . . . . The assertion that "we cannot signal faster than light" immediately provokes the question: "Who do we think we are?"
Here the italics, added by us (except for the 'we' in the final question), emphasize the two key tenets of the realist camp: that correlations should be explained, and that anthropocentric notions such as 'signalling' should play no fundamental role.
An operationalist, however, could well claim to know well enough who 'we' are, and point out that that statements about what we may, or may not, be able to do are very useful, for example in informational security proofs. From an operationalist perspective, moreover, explanations, in the sense Bell means, might be regarded as superfluous. These differences between realists and operationalists hark back to Einstein's 1919 distinction between constructive theories and principle theories [30] . But a more precise understanding of the origin of the disagreement is possible by breaking down the assumptions used in Bell's theorem to a more basic level (Sec. 5). As we will see, this is also the way towards enabling the two camps to discuss Bell's theorem using the same terms, agreeing on what combinations of assumptions it implies to be impossible 9 , even while disagreeing on which assumption is most implausible (Sec. 6).
Back to Basics
Here we make a fresh start, aiming to base Bell's theorem on notions more comprehensive and more fundamental than those defined earlier in this chapter with reference to the particular scenario of Sec. 2. Those earlier notions are temporarily abandoned, but they will gradually be reintroduced and their relation to the deeper concepts indicated.
To begin, we introduce some axioms. In calling them 'axioms' we are not implying that they are unquestionable, only that we will not question their necessity in the formulations of Bell's theorem below. Without further ado: Axiom 1 (MACROREALITY) An event observed by any observer is a real single event, and not 'relative' to anything or anyone.
This rules out consideration of the "relative state" [31] or "many worlds" [32] interpretation, as well as the extreme subjectivism of the 'QBist' interpretation [33] .
Axiom 2 (MINKOWSKI SPACE-TIME) Concepts such as space-like separation, light-cones, and foliations of SLHs are well defined in ordinary laboratory situations.
This rules out short-cuts through space ('wormholes') between distant locations [34] . There is actually no need to restrict to flat space-time; any time-orientable Lorentzian space-time manifold will do, but the above terminology is more straight-forward.
Axiom 3 (TEMPORAL ORDER
Note the term PAST is not, in this axiom, to be understood as having definite meaning; the font used is meant to alert the reader to this fact. In particular, there is no implication that all events on one side of the SLH are in the PAST of A and all events on the other side in the future of A (i.e. having A in their PAST). For example, TEMPORAL ORDER is satisfied if we take PAST to mean the past light-cone, which defines only a partial ordering of events (that is, for some pairs of events, neither is in the PAST of the other). To define an almost-total ordering of events (that is, such that for almost every pair of events, one of them is in the PAST of the other) one would need to define PAST via a fixed foliation of SLHs.
Axiom 4 (CAUSAL ARROW) Any CAUSE of an event is in its PAST. This axiom, together with axioms 2 and 3, implies a causal structure describable by a directed acyclic graph, as is standard in modelling of causation [7] . It rules out retrocausal approaches to Bell's theorem such as in Refs. [35, 36] . Note that, like PAST above, CAUSE here does not yet have any precise meaning. The meaning of these concepts will become more defined as more assumptions are added.
In moving now from axioms to postulates, we list assumptions that are more likely to be questioned, or at least that were questioned, in some form, relatively early in the literature on Bell's theorem. Indeed, if one accepts the Axioms then one must (modulo the remaining experimental loopholes) reject one of the postulates below, as we will show in Sec. 6. The first postulate (which was listed as an Axiom in Ref [4] ) begins the process of adding meaning to 'CAUSE': Postulate 1 (FREE CHOICE) A freely chosen action has no relevant CAUSES.
Here, 'relevant' means "in common with, or among, the other events under study." This postulate is not meant to indicate a philosophical commitment to Cartesian dualism, or a religious commitment to Pelagianism, although it is possibly incompat-ible with Augustinian predestination 10 . Here, it serves to rule out (when combined with other principles) what Bell called 'superdeterminism' [12] . The 'super' in 'superdeterminism' indicates that free choices would not just have causes as a matter of principle (as believed by those who hold to the 'determinist' philosophy of free will). Rather, they would of necessity have causes that are correlated in a very particular way with external physical variables that affect the outcomes of measurements. Although this viewpoint has at least one prominent scientific proponent [37], our personal view is that Postulate 1 is as unquestionable as any of the Axioms above; see footnote 14 below.
Postulate 2 (RELATIVISTIC CAUSALITY)
The PAST is the past light-cone.
Note that a term like "past light-cone" is to be understood as having definite meaning, from the Axiom of MINKOWSKI SPACE-TIME.
Postulate 3 (COMMON CAUSES) If two sets of events A and B are correlated, and no event in either is a CAUSE of any event in the other, then they have a set of common CAUSES C that EXPLAINS the correlation.
Here, common CAUSES means events that are CAUSES of at least one event in A and at least one event in B. It is important to note that this postulate is not the same as REICHENBACH's Principle of common cause [38] . Rather, following Ref. [8] (although with some differences in details) we have deliberately split Reichenbach's celebrated principle into the above Postulate of COMMON CAUSES, and the below Postulate 4 (DECORRELATING EXPLANATION) A set of CAUSES C , common to two set of events A and B, EXPLAINS a correlation between A and B only if conditioning on C eliminates the correlation.
As Reichenbach said [38] , "When we say that the common cause explains the [correlation], we refer . . . to the fact that relative to the cause the events A and B are mutually independent."
In the above principles we referred always to events, but for statistical concepts such as correlation it is more common for physicists to think in terms of variables. In such cases we will be loose with notation and terminology, and allow, for instance, A to stand for the outcome that Alice gets (a variable) as well as the event that Alice's outcome takes the value A.
Realist Principles
The axioms and postulates above form (as we will see in Sec. 6) a nice set in that they are sufficient to enforce BELL-LOCALITY, and, with one exception, all necessary. (The one exception is TEMPORAL ORDER, which is not needed if one assumes REL-ATIVISTIC CAUSALITY.) However they do not correspond to the principles stated in Bell's two theorems, and hence do not obviously connect to the two camps. Thus we will develop principles that do relate to the two camps (starting with realists) and show their relation to the postulates above.
First, since the explanation of correlations is a realist tenet, realists hold to RE-ICHENBACH's Principle, which we state here explicitly, Principle 1 (REICHENBACH) If two sets of events A and B are correlated, and no event in either is a CAUSE of any event in the other, then they have a set of common CAUSES C , such that conditioning on C eliminates the correlation.
For realists, this is the point of causation -to explain correlations. However we made that a separate assumption, as discussed above, and as captured by this: Here the common Minkowski past means the intersection of the union of past lightcones of events in A with the union of past light-cones of events in B.
The reader may well ask how this Principle of LOCAL CAUSALITY relates to the definition 5. Take the two sets of events in Principle 2 to be A = (A, a) and B = (B, b). Thus if LOCAL CAUSALITY is satisfied there must exist a set of CAUSES C in their common Minkowski past such that P(A, a, B, b|C ) = P(A, a|C )P(B, b|C ). Thus, P(B, b|A, a, C ) = P(B, b|C ), and P(B|A, a, b, C ) = P(B|b, C ). Replacing C by Bell's variables c and λ , 11 a sufficient specification of the causes by assumption, gives definition 5. This is not, however, sufficient to derive a contradiction with quantum phenomena. It was sufficient in Sec. 3 because there we were working within the framework of our definition of a MODEL in Eq. (2). Here we want a more principled derivation of the condition of BELL-LOCALITY, in Eq. (3) 11 The alert reader will have noticed some sleight of hand. In Bell's 1976 paper, where he introduced LOCAL CAUSALITY, λ denoted all events in the intersection of the past light-cones. But in Ref. [12] Bell took the λ s to be defined between two SLHs, and the limit when these become one corresponds to the situation he considered in 1964, where the λ s were "initial values of the [relevant] variables at some suitable instant." As in Fig. 2 , that suitable instant (SLH) may not even cross the intersection of the past light-cones. The resolution is that since, by assumption, the variables {λ } are the only relevant ones, they must carry the information that was present in the common causes C in the common Minkowski past of A and B. This they can without falling foul of LOCAL CAUSALITY (in the sense of Principle 2) because there is a part of the SLH that is in the future light-cone of the events in C , but in the past light-cone of A, and likewise for B. 12 Bell was immediately criticised for the vagueness of this statement (and for what followed, some of which was not sufficient for his purpose) by Shimony, Horne, and Clauser [39] . The immediacy was, according to Clauser [40] , because the latter two authors had originally drafted their 1974 paper [21] using the above Principle of LOCAL CAUSALITY (or something like it), but Shimony pointed out to them that this was not sufficient to derive BELL-LOCALITY without an extra assumption relating to free choice. As a consequence they retreated from such a principled formulation of LOCAL CAUSALITY to the more specific definition 5, which they said characterized "objective local theories" [21] , enabling a "less general and more plausible" [39] assumption (than LOCAL AGENCY, for example) relating to free choice. Clauser and Horne [21] deserve credit for first (as far as we are aware) discussing, in their footnote 13, the need for independence of the hidden variables λ from the free choices a and b which is implicit in Eq. (2). They note that to justify that assumption one has to rule out the "possibility" that "Systems originate within the intersection of the backward light cones of both analyzers and the source . . . From the lemmata in this section (noting that REICHENBACH's Principle implies the Principle of COMMON CAUSES, and applying this in Lemma 3), we can also formulate this theorem using the more fundamental postulates as follows:
Theorem 5 (Bell-1976 , in deeper principles). Quantum PHENOMENA violate the conjunction of Axioms 1-4, the Postulate of FREE CHOICE, the Postulate of RELA-TIVISTIC CAUSALITY, and REICHENBACH's Principle.
These two theorems, and the relationship between them are illustrated in Fig. 3 .
Operationalist Principles
As discussed in Sec. 4, a key difference between realists and operationalists is that the former seek to explain correlations while the latter do not (or, at least, not in the same sense). We have shown how realists can enshrine this goal in causal terms by REICHENBACH's Principle. Another key difference is that operationalists are happy to put the actors in centre-stage. Thus, operationalists should be happy to accept a notion of causation which is not about explaining all correlations, and which is agent-centric: the Principle of AGENT-CAUSATION (Principle 4 above).
Just as combining REICHENBACH's Principle with the Postulate of RELATIVIS-TIC CAUSALITY gives LOCAL CAUSALITY (the realists' favoured localist notion), here we have: as defined in the preceding section (Principle 3). We use LOCALITY rather than LOCAL AGENCY to remain faithful to Bell's original concept. However, we do also use these principles to derive another principle that was implicit for Bell in 1964:
Lemma 6. The Principle of AGENT-CAUSATION, and the Postulate of RELATIVIS-TIC CAUSALITY imply the Principle of NO SUPERDETERMINISM, where this last is:
Principle 6 (NO SUPERDETERMINISM) Any set of events on a SLH is uncorrelated with any set of freely chosen actions subsequent to that SLH.
The name of this Principle is taken from Bell [12] , and its form chosen in keeping with the assumption of PREDETERMINATION below.
Unlike LOCAL CAUSALITY, LOCALITY is not sufficient to make a theory BELL-LOCAL, even with the Principle of NO SUPERDETERMINISM. We require an additional principle, which, based on Bell's 1964 paper, we formulate as:
Principle 7 (PREDETERMINATION) For any observable event A, and any SLH S prior to it, A has CAUSES on S, which, possibly in conjunction with free choices subsequent to S, determine A.
Applying this to Bell's scenario, choose the SLH to be prior to both a and b, so that Bob's outcome is a function B(a, b, c, λ ) . By the Principle of LOCALITY, the dependence on a must be trivial, because it is space-like-separated from B. Finally, by the Principle of NO SUPERDETERMINISM, the probability of λ cannot depend on a and b. Doing the same for A, and following the same argument as in Sec. 5.1 we see that BELL-LOCALITY is obeyed. Thus, From the lemmata in this section, we can also formulate this theorem using more fundamental, and not more numerous, principles, as follows: This has the advantage of not using the term 'locality', which realists generally use with a different meaning, as discussed above. These two theorems, and the relationship between them are illustrated in Fig. 4 .
Reactions and Reconciliation
Let us now review the forms of Bell's theorem favoured by the two camps, as formulated in terms of causal principles deeper than those used by Bell This can be seen as follows. Say a set of events A is correlated with a free choice a. Now by Postulate 1, a has no relevant CAUSES. Thus by Postulate 3, the only option is that a is a CAUSE of at least one event in A , as in Principle 4. Thus operationalists still have their agent-centric notion of causation, which operational quantum mechanics respects, even with the addition of the Postulate of RELATIVIS-TIC CAUSALITY. Some following this direction believe that a replacement for the Principle of DECORRELATING EXPLANATION is open to further physical investigation [44] . The attitude each camp would be expected to take to this theorem is illustrated in Fig. 5 .
Conclusion
After thorough investigation, we suggest that the cause of the disagreement between operationalists and realists over Bell's theorem is a disagreement over causes. This leads the two camps to favour Bell's 1964 theorem and Bell's 1976 theorem respectively, because the localistic notions they employ relate to notions of agent-causation and explanatory causation respectively. However, by breaking down notions into more fundamental postulates, we could formulate what we believe is the best version of Bell's theorem, for the purposes of reconciling the two camps: CAUSALITY, respectively), knowing that the remaining assumptions reflect its philosophical position. Of course even if the two camps do agree upon a single form of Bell's theorem, their disagreement about which assumption to reject is still a substantive disagreement. But at least they could discuss the merits of their weltanschauungen using a common vocabulary, and so avoid talking past one another, or (the next stage) interminable arguments about what terms like 'locality' should mean. If, in the end, they just agree to disagree, that would still be a great improvement over the present state of affairs [1, 26, 45, 46, 47] .
Another advantage of the above formulation is that RELATIVISTIC CAUSALITY better reflects the ontology of different quantum interpretations than does a notion like LOCALITY. As has been stated a few times above, orthodox quantum mechanics respects LOCALITY, even when it is understood as a realistic theory, an understanding held by most physicists who don't think long and hard about foundations (and by some who do). That is, even the process whereby, when Alice and Bob share a singlet state, a measurement by Alice in a certain basis causes the quantum state of Bob's system to collapse instantaneously into one of the basis states, does not violate LOCALITY. Yet the very wording of the preceding sentence implies that the described process does violate RELATIVISTIC CAUSALITY 13 . By contrast, operational quantum mechanics does not violate RELATIVISTIC CAUSALITY, because it does not entail any causal narrative involving quantum states, but simply uses them as computational tools. A more precise formulation of this idea will be given elsewhere [10] .
A similar example of the advantage of talking about causes is the ability to formulate FREE CHOICE in an obvious way: that a freely chosen action has no relevant CAUSES 14 . This can be opposed to Colbeck and Renner's assumption FR, which also supposedly corresponds to "the assumption that measurements can be chosen freely" [49] , but which is actually the assumption of LOCAL AGENCY as defined in Sec. 5.1. As we have seen (Lemma 3), this can be derived from FREE CHOICE only by also using the Postulates of RELATIVISTIC CAUSALITY and COMMON CAUSES (or something similar). The assumption FR clearly embodies far more than merely freedom of choice, and interpreting it as if it does not (i.e. taking their language at face value) leads to bizarre conclusions. For example, Colbeck and Renner would be forced to claim that a typical physicist (see preceding paragraph), adhering to the realistic interpretation of orthodox quantum mechanics, does not believe in freedom of choice, even if said physicist were to believe that humans are not wholly governed by physical laws and have free will in the strongest possible philosophical sense.
Formalizing notions relating to Bell's theorem as causal principles also makes it apparent that some notions are more natural than others. In particular, the notions 13 Notably, the faster-than-light effect of Alice's choice on Bob's conditioned state has now been verified experimentally with no detector efficiency loophole [48] , unlike BELL-NONLOCALITY [14] . 14 This may sound like a strong statement, and the reader may feel tempted to follow neither the operationalist nor the realist camp, but rather to reject Postulate 1 from the list of assumptions in theorem 8. This temptation should vanish if the reader thinks through what it would actually mean to explain away Bell-correlations through the real (not just in-principle) failure of FREE CHOICE. There is no general theory that does this. If such a theory did exist, it would require a grand conspiracy of causal relationships leading to results in precise agreement with quantum mechanics, even though the theory itself would bear no resemblance to quantum mechanics. Moreover, it is hard to imagine why it should only be in Bell experiments that free choices would be significantly influenced by causes relevant also to the observed outcomes; rather, every conclusion based upon observed correlations, scientific or casual, would be meaningless because the observers's method would always be suspect. It seems to us that any such theory would be about as plausible, and appealing, as, belief in ubiquitous alien mind-control. of LOCALITY and PREDETERMINATION, which Bell introduced in his first paper, are not very natural. The first is weaker than the notion of LOCAL AGENCY that can be derived from the more fundamental postulates of AGENT-CAUSATION and RELATIVISTIC CAUSALITY, while the second is even more contrived. The latter criticism we would also level, even more strongly, at another notion which has been suggested as a replacement for PREDETERMINATION, namely 'completeness' [17] (or 'Jarrett-completeness' as one of us has called it [4] ), also known as 'outcomeindependence' [18] . In this context, more natural concepts for formulating a theorem in the style of Bell's 1964 theorem will be considered elsewhere [10] .
Finally, approaching Bell's theorem using ideas of causation can lead in new directions. For instance, if one assumes the predictions of relativistic quantum mechanics to be correct, then it seems that one can, in Theorem 8, replace the two Postulates of FREE CHOICE and RELATIVISTIC CAUSALITY by the single Postulate of NO FINE-TUNING [7] . This is a postulate that the conditional independence relations between observable events are a consequence only of the causal structure (i.e. which events are CAUSES for which other events), and are not to be explained by fine-tuning of the probabilities of events. Whether this formulation can really be regarded as having fewer postulates than the above, whether it is truly possible to dispense with FREE CHOICE, and how the two camps could be expected to react to it, are interesting questions for exploration.
